Since US President Donald Trump came to power in his first term in 2017, European countries have been in a state of anxiety due to his repeated talks about the need for the US to reduce the burden of defending Europe within NATO. These fears have resurfaced with his return to the White House in January 2025, prompting major European countries to reconsider their defense strategies in preparation for a potential contraction of the American security umbrella, coinciding with Russia's escalation towards the West since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In an analysis published by the British Royal Institute of International Affairs 'Chatham House', Senior Consulting Fellow for the International Security Programme, General Sir Richard Barrons, stated that Britain is struggling to implement the provisions of this year's defense review, which identified the depth and scale of the transformation needed to make the most significant changes in how the armed forces are designed, built, and operated in over 100 years. Conversely, a lack of funding and Britain's need for more time to provide it are hindering the implementation of the required measures to address the risks identified in the strategic defense review. At the same time, Germany, which has the largest economy in Europe, is making strenuous efforts to become the leading traditional military power in Europe in the next five years, but it still falls short of the radical military capabilities Britain is aiming for. Therefore, the two countries together can achieve better results in enhancing Europe's military capabilities as a whole. The British strategic defense review identified two requirements that have always been in conflict: the first is the requirement for deterrence, and if necessary, to fight in the new strategic reality; the second is to determine what can be done to achieve this result within a 10-year financial framework. This financial framework reflects the extremely difficult financial conditions Britain is facing: near-zero economic growth, significant challenges in the public sector, and strict constraints on the ability to increase taxes and government borrowing. This means that while British defense capabilities are supposed to reach the required levels within 10 years, they have faced immense difficulties in moving forward over the past two years due to a lack of funding. Many of Britain's partners in NATO believe the alliance needs to make tangible progress within three to five years, not ten, which means Britain is planning to develop its defense capabilities with ambition and precision, but it is taking twice the time available. This discrepancy between urgent defense needs and constraints on public spending partially explains what has been extremely difficult in the first six months of implementing the strategic defense review. The lack of additional funds in the first two years means the need to find short-term savings and spending cuts. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, program implementation shortcomings, and a reassessment of the cost of recommendations in the ten-year defense investment plan are causing some concern. Meanwhile, Germany, during the same 10-year period, will be spending vast sums on its armed forces, meaning it will quickly surpass both Britain and France in defense spending. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz pledged last May to make the German army 'the strongest traditional army in Europe'. Germany is expected to spend 3.5% of its GDP on defense by 2029, equivalent to 162 billion euros annually, including support for Ukraine. It also plans to spend 649 billion euros over the next five years, of which 400 billion euros will be financed through government borrowing following a constitutional amendment that relaxed strict borrowing constraints in Germany. Finally, Barrons sees that Britain has ambitious and modern ideas for development that struggle to bear their cost, while Germany has massive spending plans, but its thinking may be outdated. Therefore, European defense will suffer if Britain fails to bear the cost of its military transformation, while Germany is quickly spending vast sums on equipment that will soon become obsolete. Therefore, for European deterrence, it would be better to combine British thinking and German financial capabilities to build an effective defense system in Europe. With the smart use of capital and new industrial partnerships, it may be possible to find ways to improve the performance of the strategic defense review in Britain through a much stronger partnership with Germany.
